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In recent years, states have looked to reforms in advanced practice nursing scope of practice (SOP) barriers as a potential means
to increase access to primary care while reducing costs. Currently, 16 states and the District of Columbia permit advanced practice
registered nurses to practice independently of physicians, allowing them to perform functions such as diagnosing and prescribing
under their own authority within the primary care setting. Given the resistance of many physician associations to these reforms,
we asked whether the economic interests of primary care physicians might be aﬀected by reforms. Using the Bureau of Labor
Statistics data on earnings, we compared primary care physicians’ earnings in states that have instituted SOP reforms to those that
maintain these practice barriers. We also compared surgeons’ earnings as a control group. Lastly, we compared the rate of growth
in the earnings of primary care physicians and surgeons over the last ten years. This preliminary analysis revealed no evidence of
diﬀerences in earnings across the two groups of states.

1. Background
In its 2010 report, “The future of nursing: leading change,
advancing health,” the Institute of Medicine recommends the
removal of scope of practice (SOP) barriers for advanced
practice registered nurses (APRNs) such that they can “practice to the full extent of their education and training” (IOM,
S-4). Currently, only 16 states and the District of Columbia
(DC) allow APRNs to practice independently of physicians
(For this study, we employ the standards of independent
practice established by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Center to Champion Nursing in America [1], adapted
from data collected for the annual Pearson Report [2]. By
this standard, to be considered independent within a given
state, APRNs must be permitted to diagnose and treat without physician supervision and must be permitted to prescribe
medications either without physician supervision or with
the signing of a one-time collaboration agreement with a
physician or the state board of nursing (this may be for all
prescribing or, in some states, only for prescribing of controlled substances, among which certain drugs may require
case-specific consultations with a physician). In this way,

our inclusion criteria for independent practice capture only
states that grant APRNs complete or near-complete practice
autonomy). In response to the IOM recommendation, the
American Medical Association and the American Academy
of Family Physicians, among others, have expressed their
opposition, pointing out that physicians have more extensive
education and arguing that nurses are not substitutable
with primary care physicians [3, 4]. While the question of
whether there are economic interests that might be negatively
impacted by reforms is rarely discussed openly, the perceived
impact of reform, particularly on primary care physicians,
undoubtedly has and will continue to play a role in whether
and to what extent SOP laws are reformed [5].
To the extent that there is a fear that physician income
could decline as a result of expanding advanced practice
nursing SOP, the assumption would be that there is a zero
sum situation with regard to supply and demand in primary
care and that, because APRNs are paid less for their services,
payers will seek to substitute nurses in physician roles whenever possible, leading to reduced physician earnings and
influence. Such assumptions do not account for unmet need,
nor do they account for patient preferences, which may
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prioritize physician services when they are accessible, and
sometimes even when care by a nurse is oﬀered at a reduced
cost and/or wait time [6].
There is, of course, a theoretical basis for believing that
APRN services will increase competition and thus help contain costs. As an example of the eﬀect, this idea has on policy,
the Texas Legislative Budget Board has recently recommended the removal of the state’s SOP barriers as a means
of mitigating the state’s substantial primary care shortage,
as well as reducing costs to patients [7]. In their comments
on two separate bills currently before the Texas State Senate
designed to remove SOP barriers for APRNs, the U.S. Federal
Trade Commission has expressed their support, emphasizing
that the resulting increase in competition would serve the
interests of health care consumers, and adding that their
interpretation of the evidence suggests that that it would not
adversely impact quality of care [8].
Containing costs through competition among providers
is a complex proposition that we do not intend to address in
this analysis. As a first attempt to explore whether earnings
of employed primary care physicians in states with reforms
could be negatively impacted, we compare their earnings
to states that have not reformed their SOP laws. We also
compare the wages of surgeons, a group unlikely to be impacted by expanded practices of APRNs, as a way to account
for the myriad confounding factors that could aﬀect wages
across states. Finally, we compare the annual rate of change in
wages over ten years (1999 to 2009) for all three practitioner
groups to determine whether physician wages rise faster in
states that retain SOP barriers.

2. Previous Research
Identifying empirical data to support or refute the presumed
economic concerns of physicians is a complex task, both
because the data is limited and because of the methodological
challenge of attributing causality. In a literature review, only
two studies focusing on the eﬀect of SOP reforms on physician and nurse income were identified [9, 10]. Dueker et al.
used information from the current population survey (CPS)
from 1988 to 2002 for earnings data for APRNs, physician
assistants (PAs), and physicians (MDs). The authors then
constructed a binary “professional independence” variable
based on annual rankings published in Nurse Practitioner
and performed a regression analysis using this and the
wage data. Perry employed a similar methodology, but using
diﬀerent data sources. For data on nurse practitioner (“NP,” a
subset of APRNs) wages, he used the national sample survey
of registered nurses (NSSRN), for Pas, he used the American
Academy of Physician Assistants Annual Census (AAPAAC),
and for MDs, he used the CPS. Perry used two binary
variables to divide the regulatory landscape—prescriptive
autonomy and reimbursement autonomy—and constructed
two additional variables to measure the eﬀect of time since
reform on wages (on the assumption that changes in the
labor market due to regulatory change build over time).
The two studies had varied results. Dueker et al. found
that higher levels of professional autonomy were associated
with a reduction in earnings of APRNs of 21% and an

Nursing Research and Practice
increase in PA earnings of 36%, with no statistically significant eﬀect on the earnings of MDs. The authors propose
three potential models of causation to explain this eﬀect.
(1) An increase in the supply of APRNs led to lower
wages and greater practice autonomy through increased political influence of APRNs.
(2) Regulatory changes attracted a greater number of
APRNs to the state, causing wages to drop in response
to increased supply.
(3) There was a substitution eﬀect wherein regulatory
changes led to physicians hiring fewer APRNs and a
greater number of PAs (who must work under physician supervision) for fear that their employing hospital or HMO would then shift some physician functions to APRNs.
While the available data did not allow the researchers to
test these hypotheses directly, the lack of a significant correlation between changes in regulation and changes in wages
leads the authors to suggest that the third explanation—that
changes in physician hiring practices led to lower APRN and
higher PA wages—is the most likely causal pathway.
In the second study, Perry found greater NP prescriptive
autonomy to be associated with an increase in NP earnings
by an average of 1.6% per year (for each year after authority
was granted) and a decrease in PA and MD earnings of
1.4% and 7.6% per year, respectively. Greater NP payment
authority was associated with a decrease in PA earnings
of 0.3% per year, with no change in NP or MD earnings.
Greater PA prescriptive authority was associated with a
decrease in NP earnings of 0.8% per year, an increase in
MD earnings of 8% per year, and no change in PA earnings.
No significant relationship was observed between greater PA
payment authority and earnings for any of the three groups.
In the case of NP prescriptive autonomy, Perry suggests that
the observed rise in NP wages and fall in MD and PA wages
could be a result of the type of practitioner substitution
described above, wherein an increase in the number of
NPs providing primary care leads to lower MD market
share, and thus lower wages. Interpreting the results on
reimbursement autonomy, Perry suggests that, to the extent
that NPs seek greater professional independence, demand for
PAs rises to meet the demand for nonphysician caregivers
within physician-led practices. This coupling between PA
and MD earnings is also used to explain the observation that
greater PA prescriptive autonomy is associated with greater
MD earnings. Specifically, Perry suggests that the eﬃciency
gained from allowing PAs greater autonomy benefit the
practice in which PAs are employed, allowing those practices
to employ fewer physicians, leading to lower operating costs.
At the same time, reduced physician-led practice costs and
increased PA practice autonomy lead to reduced demand for
NPs, exerting downward pressure on NP earnings.
While only two studies looking at the direct impact of
SOP laws on practitioner income were found, three additional studies were found that support the hypothesis that
SOP reforms are associated with a greater supply of nurses
in a state [11–13]. Sekscenski et al. looked at the supply of
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PAs, NPs, and certified nurse midwives (CNMs) and found
a positive correlation between less restrictive nurse practice environments and nurse supply, in practitioners per
capita. Two subsequent studies [12, 13] observed a similar
correlation between supply of CNMs and less restrictive SOP
laws.
A final study found in paper [14], an unpublished graduate thesis, looked at the growth in the concentration of NPs
using county-level data across all states from 2001 to 2005
(without regard to local SOP laws). Using insurance payment
data collected by the Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality, the author performed regression analyses to investigate the relationship between growth in NP concentration
and the probability of being seen by a primary care MD (i.e.,
a family practitioner or pediatrician) when seeking primary
care and the relationship between growth in NP concentration and earnings for both NPs and MDs. In counties undergoing high growth in NP concentration (defined as those
within the top 25th percentile of NP growth over the study
period), the author found that patients had 16.5% lower
odds of seeing a family practitioner or pediatrician than in
counties with lower NP growth. The author also found that
high NP growth areas were associated with reimbursement
rates 4.42% higher for NPs and 3.1% lower for primary care
MDs. Both eﬀects were statistically significant. The author
concludes that higher NP concentrations do exert downward
pressure on primary care MD wages via the substitution
eﬀect described above, but with the qualification that the
relatively small number of NP observations available for
analysis (some 1.59% of patient visits) and the relatively
small magnitude of the impact on MD wages preclude this
eﬀect as being a driving force behind the recent shift away
from primary and towards specialty care.

3. Methodology
In order to explore whether a simple association exists between primary care physician wages and expanded APRN
SOP laws at the state level, we used 2009 annual wage data
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS) Occupational Employment Statistics Query System to compare three types of
physician practitioners across states with and without expanded scope of practice laws [15].
It is important to note that BLS data includes only “employed” physicians, who under BLS definitions were approximately 70% of all practicing physicians in 2001 and 88% in
2008 [16, 17]. The percentage of self-employed physicians
has been declining at a rate of approximately 2% per year
for at least the past 25 years [17] (Diﬀerent survey methodologies give diﬀerent results with regard to physician employment. The CPS counts a physician as employed if he or she
works any number of hours per week and thus includes a
large number of physicians working in academic and administrative capacities. Surveys by other organizations (e.g., the
Center for Studying Health System Change and the American
Medical Association) exclude respondents working under a
set number of hours or within particular specialties. Thus,
the proportion of self-employed physicians given by the CPS
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Table 1: Year of scope of practice reform.
Alaska
Arizona
Idaho
Oregon
Utah
Washington
DC
Montana
Rhode Island
Iowa
New Hampshire
Wyoming
Maine
New Mexico
Colorado∗
Hawaii∗
Maryland∗
∗ Not

Prior to 1989
Prior to 1989
Prior to 1989
Prior to 1989
Prior to 1989
Prior to 1989
1991
1991
1991
1992
1992
1992
1993
1993
2009
2009
2010

included in analysis.

is the lowest reported, as it includes the greatest number of
employed physicians.)
In this analysis, we compare the earnings of primary care
physicians (family and general practice physicians and general pediatricians) to the earnings of surgeons. We assume
that because primary care physicians’ practice overlaps with
that of APRNs, in particular nurse practitioners, whereas surgeons’ practices do not, any eﬀect on earnings from increased
nursing autonomy would appear among the former two
groups without eﬀecting surgeons’ incomes. It is important
to note that while a small number of APRNs may be certified
as first assistants in surgery, this is not an area of independent
APRN practice and, as such, would not be aﬀected by variations in SOP laws.
There are indeed likely to be a variety of factors that differ between states that have implemented SOP reforms
and those that have not. By using a comparison group within
the profession and within the same state, however, we are
able to account for a wide range of factors that might aﬀect
both practitioner groups, such as cost of living, insurance
coverage rates in the state, physician density, and percent of
population residing in rural areas.
For the comparison of states, we selected 14 of the 17
states (including DC) that instituted full SOP reform prior
to the collection of the 2009 data and compared them to the
remaining states. Of the 14 states considered, six had reforms
prior to 1989, three in 1991, three in 1992, and two in 1993
(Table 1).
The average earnings of all three practitioner types in
these states were compared to the remaining states that retain
SOP barriers. We asked whether in states where nurses can
practice independently of physicians, wages for family and
general pediatrician physicians would be reduced relative to
those of surgeons, as the latter category would not experience
increased competition from nurses. Additionally, BLS data
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4. Findings
Figures 1, 2, and 3 present our principle findings, with
average earnings and one standard deviation displayed by
specialist type for each category of states in 2009. For family
and general physicians (Figure 1), average earnings in states
without SOP barriers (full SOP) were $79.36 per hour, and
earnings in states with restrictive SOP laws were $81.15. For
general pediatricians (Figure 2), earnings in full SOP states
were $83.94 per hour, and earnings in restrictive SOP states
were $78.43 per hour. For surgeons (Figure 3), earnings
in full SOP states were $107.23 per hour, and earnings in
restrictive SOP states were $103.85. In all three practitioner
groups, average earnings in full and restrictive SOP states fell
within one standard deviation of one another, confirming
that, for each group, the variation in earnings between the
two types of states is not statistically significant.
The annual rate of change in physician earnings over
ten years is presented in Figure 4. For family and general
physicians, wages rose by 5.73% per year in full SOP states
and 5.11% per year in restrictive SOP states. For general pediatricians, wages rose by 5.61% per year in full SOP states and
4.34% per year in restrictive SOP states. For surgeons, wages
rose by 6.39% per year full SOP states and 5.61% per year in
restrictive SOP states. These data again reveal no statistically
significant diﬀerences between primary care physicians (family practice and physicians and general pediatricians), whose
practice might be in competition with NPs in states with
more liberal SOP laws, and that of surgeons, whose practice
does not overlap with that of NPs.

5. Discussion
Our findings are descriptive and do not establish causality.
However, they suggest that, at least among employed primary

Figure 2: General pediatrician earnings in states with and without
SOP barriers, 2009 (with national average and standard deviation).
Source: [16].
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from 1999 (the earliest date for which wage data was available
for these specific categories of practitioners) was used to
calculate the annual rate of change in wages for all three practitioner groups.
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Figure 1: Family and general physician earnings, 2009 (with national average and standard deviation). Source: [16].
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Figure 3: Surgeon earnings in states with and without SOP barriers,
2009 (with national average and standard deviation). Source: [16].

care physicians, expanded SOP laws do not impact their
earnings. This diﬀers from the findings of Dueker et al. and
Perry, both of whom observed eﬀects on both nurse and
physician wages following the removal of SOP laws. These
eﬀects, however, could not be demonstrated to be a direct
result of changes in SOP laws, and both the magnitude and
direction of the eﬀect were diﬀerent between the two studies.
In contrast, our analysis found no significant association
between earnings in either direction for the physician groups
compared.
The rate of change calculations yielded did not reveal
diﬀerences either. In fact, wages for all three practitioner
groups rose at a slightly faster rate between 1999 and 2009
in states with more liberal SOP laws in states with restrictive
laws. Where competition from NPs directly aﬀecting the
wages of MD via a substitution eﬀect, one would expect to
see the reverse—a slower rate of wage growth in states where
nurses are allowed to compete for primary care dollars.
This preliminary analysis suggests that MD wages are
not aﬀected by changes in SOP barriers and/or that the
removal of SOP barriers has a more nuanced eﬀect on MD
wages than simple economic substitution. For example, it is
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Figure 4: Average annual percent change in physician wages, 1999–
2009. Source: [16].

possible that, as APRNs assume a more independent role in
primary care, other primary care providers begin to take on
more complex and thus more costly cases. However, the fact
that the same trends in wage growth were observed among
surgeons as well as primary care physicians also suggests that
they were due to factors unrelated to diﬀerences in SOP laws,
as surgeon wages are unlikely to be aﬀected by SOP laws.
This analysis relied on a comparison of wage data at just
two points in time and did not control for other factors (e.g.,
NP supply changes, physician density, rates of insurance coverage, and local economic conditions). It is therefore possible
that the true correlation between SOP laws and practitioner
earnings was masked by confounders. In addition, it only
provides data on employed physicians and excludes selfemployed physicians. It also includes a number of employed
physicians who work in research and academic settings,
whose practice would not be “substitutable” with NPs.
To build upon this study, future work should identify
and control for known confounders, employ additional years
of data to further explore possible relationships between
APRN SOP reform and practitioner wages, and employ more
granular data sets to determine whether wages vary based on
physician and practice characteristics.
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